Energy Self-Sufficiency and the Supply of the Domestic Market Brief Considerations to the Argentine Case by Dicasolo, Daniel H. & Ramos Mejia, Juan F.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 15 | Number 3 Article 10
2009
Energy Self-Sufficiency and the Supply of the
Domestic Market Brief Considerations to the
Argentine Case
Daniel H. Dicasolo
Juan F. Ramos Mejia
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Update is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel H. Dicasolo et al., Energy Self-Sufficiency and the Supply of the Domestic Market Brief Considerations to the Argentine Case, 15 Law
& Bus. Rev. Am. 683 (2009)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol15/iss3/10
ENERGY SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND THE
SUPPLY OF THE DOMESTIC MARKET
BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS TO THE
ARGENTINE CASE
Daniel H. DicdsoloI and Juan F. Ramos Mejia (h)2
I. INTRODUCTION
OST hydrocarbon producing countries have long pursued the
goal of achieving oil and gas self-sufficiency, and Argentina is
no exception. Becoming self-sufficient is particularly impor-
tant to these countries because it is often hard for them to depend on
international sources of oil and gas, especially when prices are rising.
Argentine Law No. 17319 provides that the aim of the national hydro-
carbon policy is "satisfying the domestic needs with the yield of the coun-
try's oil and gas fields, keeping enough reserves to assure that end."' 3 The
application of this goal has been subject to countless interpretations and
debates over time. Nowadays, figuring out how Argentina should assure
the oil and gas domestic supply is a dilemma that needs prompt
resolution.
II. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: BRIEF DESCRIPTION
The regulatory framework of the industry was framed at the beginning
of the 1990s, in accordance with the deregulation of the industry initiated
with the privatization of Argentina's National Oil Company, Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales ("YPF"), and National Gas Company ("Gas del
Estado").
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Pursuant to the regulatory framework, private oil and gas companies
were granted the right to own exploration and exploitation concessions,
and to dispose freely of the produced hydrocarbons. Although exports
still remained subject to the previous approval of the government, export
duties were repealed. Private companies were also allowed to repatriate
freely up to seventy percent of their revenue. 4
Natural gas pipelines, previously owned by the government, were as-
signed to private companies and regulated as natural monopolies. Trans-
port and distribution prices were regulated through a price cap system
adjusted by the Producers Price Index ("PPI") of the United States and
subject to a periodic revision.
In this regard, the regulatory framework seemed to work smoothly
throughout the decade. As a result, Argentina managed to achieve the
long-sought goal of hydrocarbon self-sufficiency and even became a hy-
drocarbon exporter. But the above system suffered considerable changes
after the 2001 to 2002 Argentine economic crisis, which unraveled the
self-sufficiency that had previously been attained.
III. THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCY
Argentina suffered a massive economic depression from 2001 to 2002.
Excessive public spending and a severe monetary policy that pegged the
Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar ("USD") caused the depression. The
situation collapsed as a result of a run on the peso, revealing the inability
of local banks to pay back deposits made in U.S. dollars. Five constitu-
tional presidents had to resign in less than a month.
As a result, the government pesofied 5 all bank deposits and private
debts, and devaluated the currency more than 300%. This government
action was followed by the largest default of sovereign debt in history.
Default of sovereign debt and devaluation allowed the government to
curb the spending deficit, but it also lead to a tremendous cut in the real
wage of Argentine people. Devalued income in pesos made the domestic
market unattractive as a consumption market and provided an edge for
low cost exports.
IV. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR THE EMERGENCY
The political response of the government was to ensure the domestic
supply of oil and gas at affordable prices. In order to achieve such a goal
it returned to the long-standing tradition of government intervention.
A. CONTROL OF DOMESTIC PRICES
The first measure issued by the government as a result of the 2001 to
4. Decree No. 158989, Jan. 4, 1990, [26794] B.O. 11.
5. See Law No. 25561, Jan. 7, 2002, [29810] B.O. 1.
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2002 crisis was to freeze the domestic price of oil and natural gas.6 Trans-
port and distribution tariffs of natural gas utilities were converted into
devaluated pesos. Adjustment of price caps according to PPI was de-
clared void and further tariff revisions were suspended for an indetermi-
nate period of time. As a result, many utility companies filed claims
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes("ICSID").
Wellhead gas value was severely affected by the volumes of gas pur-
chased at a below market price by domestic distribution companies. In-
stead of returning to direct regulation, producers were invited to sign
several domestic supply and pricing agreements with the government,
through which producers committed to deliver certain volumes of natural
gas at what the government considered to be a reasonable price.
As low prices crowded out investment and insufficiency became appar-
ent, the government gave preference to residential and commercial con-
sumers, gas fired power plants, and Compressed Natural Gas ("CNG"),
used as an alternative fuel by almost half of taxi drivers and a considera-
ble number of other vehicles. The remaining was left to industries, which
as a result of an unbundling process were prompted to purchase their gas
at free market prices and had to face recurrent cuts during the winter.
Liquid hydrocarbons suffered similar restraints. Several diesel supply
and pricing agreements were executed by the government with domestic
producers. In turn, producers and local pump stations were urged not to
increase gasoline and other fuels prices. Diesel, which is widely used for
transport and for the crop harvest, had to be imported to complete the
domestic supply.
B. EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS
Exchange control regulations typically require the conversion of all in-
coming foreign currency into Argentine pesos. More importantly, the
Central Bank usually establishes the official exchange rate at which the
conversion must take place, a rate that is generally below market.
In this particular situation, the government did not establish an official
exchange rate, but hydrocarbon companies were still urged to convert
100% of their income into pesos.7 In contrast, local hydrocarbon laws
granted them the right to repatriate freely up to seventy percent.8
Although the exchange control regime was later repealed, several ad-
ministrative files for exchange offenses have been raised against hydro-
6. See Law No. 25561 of Jan. 7, 2002, arts. 8-9 (pesofying the tariffs charged by public
utilities and allowing the government to renegotiate those contracts).
7. Decree 16062001, Dec. 6, 2001, [29790] B.O. 4, and Decree 722002, established a
general exchange-control regime, which provided for an obligation to convert into
pesos all foreign currency originated in exports. Through Attorney General Opin-
ion 2352002, the Attorney General understood that this new regime also included
oil companies previously exempted.
8. Decree No. 158989, Jan. 4, 1990, [26794] B.O. 11.
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carbon companies that failed to bring in the whole of their export
revenue.
C. EXPORT DUTIES AND RESTRICTIONS
The 2002 Emergency Law authorized the government to levy a tax on
hydrocarbon exports, with the purpose of providing some extra income
while discouraging a feared flood of commodities towards the more at-
tractive export market.9 Export restrictions and duties have consistently
been applied in the country after every significant devaluation of the
currency.
As a first measure, the government established a domestic supply
quota for crude and other fuels,10 which was later repealed,11 and levied a
twenty percent export duty.12 As the domestic situation deteriorated and
international prices rose to more than USD 100/bbl, those percentages
were increased significantly, as a domestic supply quota of diesel was
reinstated.13
In November 2007, the government a ceiling price on oil exports at
USD 42/bbl, the remaining being taxed increasingly according to the in-
ternational prices increments.1 4 Exports of gasoline, diesel, and other fu-
els were taxed on the same basis. The government would not allow oil
companies to keep windfall profits.
Likewise, natural gas exports were restricted as long as producers were
not able to supply adequately domestic demand. An export duty was first
established at twenty percent and later increased to forty-five percent,
tied to the regional price.1 5 In practical terms, Argentine exporters en-
ded up paying an export duty of forty-five percent over the import price
from Bolivia, which was initially set at five USD/ MMBTU. 16 This im-
plied in practical terms an export duty of 2.25 USD/MMBTU.
As the import price from Bolivia rose, the tax increased. When the
political situation in Bolivia undermined its ability to deliver the gas com-
mitted to Argentina, the government authorized the import liquefied nat-
ural gas. Having liquefied natural gas facilities, Argentina arranged for a
re-gasification ship to be moored in a port in the south of the Province of
Buenos Aires. At the beginning of 2008, the basis for the calculation of
the export duty was raised to the highest import price available (i.e. 15-17
9. Law No. 25561 of Jan 7, 2002.
10. Decree 867/2002, May, 24, 2002, B.O. 11
11. Energy Secretariat Resolution No. 341/2002.
12. Decree 310/2002, Feb 14, 2002 B.O. 4.
13. The Energy Secretariat Resolution No. 16792004 provided that no export authori-
zations would be released unless evidence was provided that the demand of all
domestic refineries had been satisfied. Energy Secretariat Resolution No.
16792004, Dec. 24, 2004, [30555] B.O. 4.
14. Minister of Economy and Planification Resolution No. 3942007, Nov. 16, 2007,
[31283] B.o. 10.






During the 1990s, the Republic of Argentina implemented a legal
framework based on free-market policies that ended the country's depen-
dency on foreign oil and fuels, achieved domestic supply, and allowed
Argentina to become an exporter of hydrocarbons.
The acute economic crisis of 2001 to 2002 triggered an emergency pack-
age, which led to several investment disputes raised by utilities and other
foreign owned companies with the ICSID. Export restrictions and duties
substantially reduced the company-take part of the business and caused
severe disruptions in the relationship with neighboring countries and
companies.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, there is a light at the end of the
tunnel. The government has recently approved the Gas Plus Program, a
means by which newly discovered gas may be sold at new (unregulated)
prices. A similar program has been announced for petroleum and refin-
ery that will allow for a substantial reduction in export duties. There is
much expectation and hope that these programs will foster new invest-
ments and help solve Argentina's supply dilemma.
17. Id.
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